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Abstract 
The process of innovation is inherently complex, and it occurs within an even more 
complex institutional environment characterized by incomplete information, market 
power, and externalities. There are therefore different competing approaches to 
supporting and financing innovation in medical technologies, which bring their own 
advantages and disadvantages. This article reviews value- and cost-based pricing, as 
well direct government funding, and cross-cutting institutional structures. It argues 
that performance-based risk-sharing agreements are likely to have little effect on the 
sustainability of financing; that there is a role for cost-based pricing models in some 
situations; and that the push towards longer exclusivity periods is likely contrary to the 
interests of industry. 
 
1. Introduction 
Financing of innovative therapies requires, ultimately, the allocation of 
resources large enough to support innovation, while sustainability requires that payers 
find that the innovation delivers good value, compared to other potential ways of 
allocating their resources. This review explores the literature on the different 
approaches taken by governments and insurers to balance these two conflicting goals.  
The responses to these problems are of several types, but we can, for the most 
part, categorize them into three different broad strategies. The first response is “value-
based pricing”, in which reimbursement or pricing depends on the therapeutic value 
of the product. The second response is “cost-based pricing”, in which reimbursement 
or pricing is based on the imputed cost of the product. The third response is “direct 
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funding” of innovation through government grants or product-development 
partnerships. In addition, there are other strategies that work within or across each of 
these three pricing strategies. I discuss each of these strategic responses in turn. 
The set of actors that provide financing for innovation is large and varied. 
National governments and product-development partnerships may provide direct 
funding; insurers typically fund through the prices that they pay, but these may be 
influenced by the direct funding model employed. These actors typically have very 
different goals, with insurers focused on getting the best outcomes from the existing 
set of therapies, while government policy may have an additional focus of trying to 
encourage innovation. In many cases, governments are also interested in industrial 
development: research and manufacturing jobs in pharmaceuticals are politically 
attractive. These actors may also have differing ideas about what is valuable. 
Arguments commonly include about whose health to value; whether to include patient 
and caregiver convenience; how to weigh future health benefits; how to incorporate 
cost savings; and whether to reward technical inventiveness. These issues often 
underlie disputes about the value of innovation, but I abstract from them in this essay 
and assume a common understanding of what is valuable. As Pekarsky notes, in 
addition, innovation may arise in many domains, including clinical, resource-saving, 
and manufacturing.(1)  
2. Value-based pricing 
I use the term “value-based pricing” to indicate a pricing model according to 
which the reimbursed prices for innovative therapies are more or less related to the 
net incremental benefits delivered by therapies. For example, in an idealized model, 
the insurer would set the same reimbursement per incremental Quality-Adjusted Life-
Year (QALY) generated by different novel therapies, but VBP can be influential even 
when it neither perfectly not universally implemented. Generally, the shift towards 
reliance on health technology assessments (HTA) has moved payers towards a VBP 
framework. The adoption of HTA processes in more and more countries is shown by 
the rapid growth of the International Network of Agencies for Health Technology 
Assessment.(2) While HTA has been a health policy instrument in many countries at 
least since the 1980s, in the last 15 years it has become to an increasing extent central 
to decisions on pricing and reimbursement.(3)  
Paying for what society values seems like an obvious approach, but because it 
is technically challenging, insurers often use alternative approaches, such as setting 
prices based on prices in other countries or on prices of other comparable drugs.(4,5) 
Similarly, manufacturers will seek prices that are not consistent with VBP on the basis 
that their drug is special: for example, because it treats a rare disease, or provides “end 
of life” care, or the like.(6,7)  
In comparison to alternative approaches, VBP generally offers the promise of 
increased sustainability for two reasons. First, by targeting scarce resources at the most 
cost-effective technologies, it ensures that society gets better value for money. Second, 
the incentives of innovators are aligned with the interests of society under VBP. Thus 
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VBP, broadly defined, is a central part of ensuring sustainable financing of innovative 
therapies. 
VBP has attractive features, but there are many, many details that must be 
addressed.(8) First, exactly what dimensions of value are to included and measured? 
Value could incorporate not only health benefits – as summarized, for example, in 
QALYs – but also other dimensions, including patient convenience, cost savings, 
degree of innovation, and cost of R&D. There is unfortunately no consensus about 
what dimensions of value should be taken into account.(9) In addition, there are 
arguments commonly made for special consideration of unmet needs or disease 
characteristics that are not included in the QALY. Measuring and aggregating the 
various dimensions of value, with adjustments, is then required. And then the payer 
must identify a threshold willingness to pay per unit of “value”.  
The problems of measurement of value are daunting, as suggested by the 
updated 2015 ISPOR guidelines on cost-effectiveness research.(10) One particularly 
challenging area is that generic instruments such as HUI-3 or EQ-5D, while effective 
for comparing across a wide range of health outcomes, are often alleged to be 
insufficiently sensitive to health outcomes within a particular disease. There has 
therefore been an efflorescence of disease-specific measurement instruments, 
although mapping to generic measures such as the QALY has introduced additional 
uncertainty.(11)(12) 
In addition, pre-approval clinical trials may fail to reflect the value of the 
therapy in a real-world setting. The 2015 ISPOR guidelines therefore argue that it is 
“generally acknowledged that pragmatic effectiveness trials are the best vehicle for 
economic studies”.(10) Pragmatic clinical trials, while they deliver information about 
the actual effectiveness of therapies in the population, are also costly and technically 
challenging. In addition, they may impose a heavy burden on healthcare systems to 
deliver reliable information, and create new ethical problems that must be 
addressed.(13)(14)  
One of the central components of the VBP approach to funding new 
therapies is that it requires the funders to determine an appropriate threshold for cost-
effectiveness.(15) There are two general approaches to determining this threshold. In 
the “demand” side model, the threshold is based on societal willingness to pay. The 
insurer’s budget must thus adjust to accommodate all treatments that meet the 
threshold. In the “supply” side model, the healthcare budget is set, and the threshold 
reflects the opportunity cost within the set of treatments available. In either case, an 
underlying principle in VBP is that the value obtained from expenditures on each 
intervention, at the margin, should be greater than the value that can be obtained from 
using the resources in any other way.(16) The implementation of th supply-side model 
requires setting a threshold based on opportunity cost.  If the threshold is set too high, 
then the payers will end up harming health outcomes by funding new therapies that 
displace expenditures on other more cost-effective treatments. This result can easily 
arise, nonetheless, if payers lack comprehensive information about opportunity cost in 
their health system or have a bias in favor of identifiable patients over the unidentified 
patients whose treatment is displaced.(17) While the UK’s National Health Service 
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(NHS) has traditionally used a threshold in the range of £20,000 to £30,000, Claxton 
et al have recently made an argument that the central mean marginal price of a QALY 
in the NHS is approximately £12,900.(18) This would imply that innovative therapies 
funded by the NHS at prices that were deemed acceptable because of incremental cost 
per QALY of, say, £20,000 will harm overall health outcomes.  Pekarsky convincingly 
argues that the payer needs to consider what is being displaced, recognizing the 
political economy in which pharmaceutical companies have considerable sway over 
policy, while other competitively-provided therapy – such as nursing care – is less well 
represented by lobbyists.(1)  
The threshold values used in high-income countries have been centered 
around a $50,000 per QALY for many years.(9) However, the range of estimates for 
the most appropriate threshold is relatively wide. The World Health Organization has 
proposed that a interventions with a cost per QALY of 3 times GDP are cost-
effective, while interventions costing less than 1 times GDP are highly cost 
effective.(19)(20) This approach has attracted considerable criticism for its failure to 
reflect local circumstances.(20) Recent empirical work suggests that for many low- and 
middle-income countries, the relevant opportunity costs within the health system is 
much lower than the WHO-recommended threshold, and probably below per capita 
GDP.(21)(22) 
A much lower cost-effectiveness threshold for new therapies will reduce the 
flow of investment into innovation, which in turn would imply that the “sustainable” 
flow of innovative therapies should be set at a relatively low level. If the threshold is 
set too high, it will support an “unsustainable” level of innovation in the sense that 
expenditures on the innovation deliver negative value to society.(1) If instead the 
threshold is set too low, the flow of innovation will be stifled and patients will not 
have access to cost-effective treatments.  
2.1 Expenditure caps 
Expenditure caps are an important strategy commonly used by payers in 
recent years as an addition to VBP. These are packaged in different ways: “risk-sharing 
agreements” and “managed entry agreements” in which the expenditures of the 
insurer on a given drug are capped at an agreed amount.(23) These kinds of 
agreements are often portrayed as offering risk-mitigation for the risk-averse 
insurer.(24) It is hard to understand what risks are mitigated, since the expenditure on 
a given drug is generally only a tiny fraction of total health care expenditures by the 
insurer.  Nevertheless, many insurers require manufacturers to provide “budget 
impact assessments” whose main purpose appears to be to limit expenditure on those 
drugs anticipated to have a large total cost.(25) 
An expenditure cap appears to work against the incentives created by VBP, 
since it limits the upside of the manufacturer and thus reduces the motivation to 
develop the therapies with the greatest potential to improve population health. 
Nevertheless, an expenditure cap may still be optimal to reduce investment in 
innovation. A well-known result in economics shows that racing to obtain a patent 
can induce excessive, duplicative effort.(26) This is similar to the insight that there 
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may be excessive entry in industries with monopolistic competition. And indeed, we 
see in pharmaceutical markets that racing and duplication are common: “The 
prevailing drug development paradigm is one in which a number of firms will pursue 
investigational drugs with similar chemical structures or the same mechanism of action 
before any drug in the class obtains regulatory marketing approval.”(27) The arrival of 
many direct-acting antivirals to treat hepatitis C in the last few years is a classic 
example of this phenomenon.  
Racing within a class is more probable when the class of drugs offers a large 
prize (i.e., patent-based exclusivity) to the early entrants. If the prize is reduced, the 
extent of duplication and racing will also be reduced. This can increase the overall 
efficiency of the industry, since fewer resources are expended in an effort to capture 
the same reward. Creating a revenue cap may be an efficient strategy to address this 
issue. However, this requires a complex balancing act: we want to create the incentives 
that will encourage firms to engage in exactly the most socially beneficial amount of 
research on the right projects. By reducing the prize for succeeding in the largest 
markets, we may have little effect on development speed of therapies in those classes, 
while leaving more resources available for research in other areas. In effect, there is an 
argument that the optimal allocation of resources should not be linearly related to the 
total therapeutic benefits achieved. (However, when a jurisdiction represents only a 
small fraction of the global demand for the product, it must have only a small impact 
on the process of drug development.) 
One perspective on this is that this is exactly the strategy we observe for 
orphan drugs: they are, in effect, often allowed a high price on the basis that their 
revenues otherwise might be too small to justify investment in research and 
development.(7) Of course, this requires that the insurer balance the benefits from 
more rapid development of high-value therapies against the benefits from 
development of more therapies that have a relatively small effect on population health. 
2.2 Approval conditions 
Another method to reduce inefficiency created by excessive competition is to 
make the approval conditions for “me-too” or “follow-on” drugs more restrictive 
than for “first in class” drugs.(28) Payers can effectively achieve the same outcome by 
requiring large discounts from later entrants as a condition for obtaining formulary 
listing or favorable insurance status. Discouraging later entrants helps to reduce 
competitive promotional spending, and could thus increase the profitability of 
industry. Again, we see this kind of approach being used for orphan drugs, with the 
US Orphan Drug Act granting a 7-year period of market exclusivity that can protect a 
product even from competition from another product with the same indications.(29) 
2.3 Performance-based mechanisms 
“Performance-based risk-sharing agreements” (PBRSAs) extend VBP to make 
pricing depend explicitly how the therapy performs in the population, rather than how 
it is expected to perform. PBRSAs take many forms, including outcomes-based schemes, 
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risk-sharing agreements, coverage with evidence development, access with evidence 
development (AED), patient access schemes, conditional licensing, and managed entry 
agreements.(23,30–35) The 2013 ISPOR task force report on PBRSAs discusses the 
design choices more fully.(30) The key features of PBRSAs are that (1) data on 
outcomes is collected following regulatory approval and introduction of the drug to 
the market, and (2) the reimbursement to the manufacturer is conditional on the data 
collected.(30)  
Evidently, for PBRSAs to be different from a standard pricing arrangement, it 
must be the case that there is some uncertainty about the outcomes that the drug will 
generate. (Otherwise, payers could spare themselves the trouble of collecting data.) 
Because this uncertainty is resolved as the drug comes to market and the data is 
collected, it is apparent that PBRSAs “better align the rewards to the manufacturer 
with the value that the patients—represented by the payers—would assign to the new 
intervention.”(p. 706) (30) It is, however, unclear what effect this improved alignment 
will have.  
PBRSAs do not obviously create savings for payers compared to standard 
VBP mechanisms. For example, if the structure of the PBRSA is a money-back 
guarantee, the manufacturer only receives payment when the product is successful in 
an individual patient. Suppose that a drug is expected to be successful at creating 10 
QALYs (on average) in 50% of patients, and has no effect in the remaining 50%. 
Then, using a standard VBP approach and a threshold of say $20,000, the payer 
should be willing to pay $100,000 per patient treated. With a PBRSA, the payer will 
pay for only the successful treatments, but should pay up to $200,000 per patient. The 
overall cost to the payer and revenue to the manufacturer are almost unchanged, 
assuming that expectations are, on average, correct and that the marginal production 
cost is relatively small. (If expectations are systematically biased, for example because 
payers do not learn from experience, then PBRSAs may of course affect 
expenditures.) 
In practice, PBRSAs appear to have had a limited impact on spending. In Italy, 
which has been particularly active in using risk-sharing contracts, PBRSAs have been 
structured so that they offer reimbursement of the insurer by the manufacturer in 
cases of non-responding patients. Total spending on drugs with such risk-sharing 
schemes was EUR3.7bn during the period 2006-12, but the total amount of 
reimbursement to the insurer was EUR121m, or about 3%.(36) Given that 
manufacturers must have required a higher price in order to accept the risk of having 
to make reimbursement, 3% is an upper bound on the amount of savings generated 
by the risk-sharing schemes. In addition, as there are substantial costs to contracting 
and then enforcing PBRSAs (37), it is unclear whether risk-sharing agreements will 
confer much financial benefit to payers. A different approach in which additional 
payments were made based on exceeding some standard, rather than repayment 
required in case of non-response, might generate more savings. 
A separate question is whether this improved alignment of rewards with social 
value leads to more efficient incentives to invest in innovative therapies. The decision 
to invest in developing a new therapy will depend on the revenues expected at that 
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time. Those revenues will depend on the expected volume times the expected price. A 
PBRSA would not change the incentive to invest in developing the therapy unless it 
changed either the expected volume or the expected price. The effect of PBRSA is 
that it makes the price dependent on the actual outcomes, instead of the expected 
outcomes. If the expected outcomes of new therapies are the same, on average, as 
actual outcomes, then on average the price will be the same with and without a 
PBRSA. At the time of investing in developing a drug, the innovator must, however, 
rely on expectations, which are therefore the same with and without a PBRSA. This 
means that PBRSAs should not substantially change the set of innovations that come 
to market, compared to a “standard” VBP scheme in which prices are based on the 
expected performance of the new product.  
PBRSAs may be particularly relevant as a tool to incentivize manufacturers to 
develop appropriate evidence on the effectiveness and safety of products. For 
example, a PBRSA could be designed to make the price conditional on the quality of 
data and the reduction in uncertainty about how optimally to use a given therapy.(38) 
AED schemes may similarly enable early access to an innovative product for patients 
who have poor alternatives, while controlling access for patients who have good 
alternatives.(23) AED schemes may be required when the payer or regulator faces 
uncertainty about safety, efficacy, or budgetary implications.(23)   
PBRSAs do not appear to be a solution to the problem of funding for 
innovative therapies, although such agreements have often been represented as a tool 
to achieve “financial sustainability.”(39) They are unlikely to substantially change 
incentives for innovation; they are unlikely to change total expenditures much, on 
average; and to the extent that they generate improved information about how to 
target and use new therapies optimally, they do so at an additional cost because of the 
need to collect data. However, PBRSAs do at least enable payers to feel comfortable 
that they are receiving good value for specific innovative therapies reimbursed, and 
this may be an important component to sustainability of financing. 
3. Cost-based pricing 
A different strategy to achieve sustainability is cost-based pricing. When both 
the cost of an innovation and its value can be observed by government, then the “best” 
mechanism for supporting innovation is for the government to commission a firm to 
develop the innovation and then to pay the firm based on its costs at the time of 
delivery.(40) Of course, knowledge of both cost and value is unlikely, particularly in 
advance of the development of the innovation, which is why incentive systems based 
on value observed ex post are used. In addition, basing price on cost in an innovative 
industry may badly skew incentives towards spending money on innovations with little 
value.  
Despite this, costs are sometimes viewed as a relevant part of the pricing 
decision. For example, Jeffrey Sachs has argued that Gilead should be compensated 
based on its cost in developing sofosbuvir, which he estimates as at most $500m. He 
reckons that since only about 10% of drugs are brought successfully to market, Gilead 
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deserves to earn a “prize” of $5bn.(41) Being fully compensated for the risk-adjusted 
cost of development, he proposes, should be sufficient to induce firms to invest. This 
approach is reminiscent of the UK’s Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, which 
controlled prices through a complex calculation based on a maximum rate of return 
on capital invested.(42) This scheme was designed to reward inputs rather than 
outputs.(43) In such a system, a low-value product produced at high cost may have a 
higher regulated price than a high-value product produced at a low cost, distorting 
investment choices.(44)  
 Various studies, often cited by industry, calculate the cost of bringing a new 
drug to market.(45,46) In a way, these papers subtly reinforce the idea that 
compensation should somehow be related to cost, at least on average, since they are 
often used to provide a justification for high prices. This information is, however, a 
two-edged sword, since if companies can argue that they need high prices because 
their costs of R&D are high, payers can equally argue that revenues for drugs should 
not be far above the estimated average cost.  
Indeed, exactly this sort of reasoning seems to underlie the set of proposed 
regulations in the US states that call for pharmaceutical companies to justify their 
prices and to provide transparency about their research costs.(47) While these 
proposals have not yet been turned into law, they do suggest a trend in the way that 
governments are thinking about how to make pharmaceuticals sustainable. The recent 
Senate report on how Gilead brought sobosbuvir to market, and then priced it, shows 
that at least parts of the US government are considering how prices relate to the cost 
of development.(48)  
Danzon and Towse (2003) make a related argument: they claim that “Under 
well-designed differential pricing, prices in affluent (and, to a lesser extent, middle 
income countries) exceed the marginal cost of production and distribution in these 
countries by enough, in aggregate, to cover the joint costs of R&D, while prices in 
[developing countries] cover only their marginal cost.”(49) The core assumption here 
is that because of monopolistic competition, economic profits are driven to zero in 
the long run. With the proposed differential pricing, countries would bear a Ramsey-
efficient (i.e. deadweight loss-minimizing) share of costs. This model also implies that 
prices should ultimately be related to underlying costs.  
For some orphan drugs, there may be a case for using the average cost of drug 
development as a tool in pricing negotiations.(42) The challenge is that the normal 
value-based pricing methodologies are inoperable for some “ultra-orphan” drugs, 
which are far from meeting the usual cost-effectiveness thresholds. As a result, payers 
are faced with the problem of deciding whether to pay for an expensive medicine, but 
they cannot apply their standard decision rules that are based on cost-effectiveness. A 
cost-based pricing rule at least creates some kind of upper bound on a reasonable 
price in cases in which the insurer faces an imperative to reimburse the medicine.  
Generally, it is clear that cost-based pricing could create significant problems. 
The most important of these is that, if rewards are not related to the value of 
innovations, the incentives to invest in what society values the most will be 
undermined. The strength of our patent system, as Adam Smith noted in 1763, is its 
Sustainable Financing of Innovative Therapies Hollis 
May 2016 9 
foundation on the principle that innovation is directed to the areas where there is the 
greatest willingness to pay.(50) [P. 83] If innovators were rewarded based on their 
costs because they invented something “good enough” to get a patent, there would be 
a flood of worthless inventions. While there may be special circumstances in which 
costs are relevant, a general cost-based system of price controls would face intractable 
problems of misallocating rewards. 
4. Direct non-commercial funding 
4.1 Government-funded research 
A completely different approach to sustainable finance for innovative 
therapies is direct investment by government in R&D. Most high-income countries 
have a substantial investment in basic R&D through national research programs such 
as the US’s National Institutes of Health (NIH). To an increasing extent, governments 
are also involved in later-stage clinical research. Government funding contributes 
significantly to the research program of pharmaceutical companies, with recent 
research finding that each $10m in NIH pharmaceutical investment yielding 2.3 
patents.(51) Assuming reasonable patent valuations, NIH research generates 
considerable private value captured by pharmaceutical companies, much greater than 
the NIH’s expenditures; and the social value is of course even greater.(51) This seems 
to imply that governments spend too little on state-funded medical research, if they 
value both patient welfare and firm profits. 
Another argument for government-funded research is that governments have 
a lower cost of capital and lower discount rate. Since the cost of capital is a very 
important aspect of the total cost of innovation, because of the long delay from early 
research to the time when a medicine is actually used in the market, government could 
have a substantial cost advantage in doing research, compared to industry.(52) To be 
sure, there are many other issues that come into play regarding incentives and the 
ability of government to manage a complex and risky discovery process. However, the 
advantage of government in the earliest-stage research is considerably enhanced by its 
lower cost of capital. 
Governments also contribute to the research process through the structure of 
the tax system. In many countries there is special treatment of R&D expenses in the 
tax code. A particularly important tool here is the orphan drug tax credit in the US, 
which effectively subsidizes clinical trial costs for orphan drugs. One concern 
commonly expressed is that taxpayers may end up “paying twice” for a medicine, once 
through the tax credit and again after the product is introduced to the market.(53)  
4.2 Product-development partnerships 
In some cases, other entities are supporting grant-funded innovation to the 
point of bringing products to approval. The most important examples of this are the 
“product-development partnerships”.(54) The most ambitious of these is likely the 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi) which has a business plan to launch 
Sustainable Financing of Innovative Therapies Hollis 
May 2016 10 
16 to 18 new treatments with a total investment of EUR650m by 2023.(55) This is 
roughly EUR38m per treatment, which is roughly 1.5% of the $2,550m investment by 
commercial enterprises to develop new drugs, as estimated by diMasi and 
colleagues.(46) If DNDi can deliver new treatments at such a tiny fraction of the cost 
of “big pharma”, it will create a serious challenge to the structure of our current bio-
pharmaceutical industry. 
The feasibility of a significant role for product-development partnerships is 
supported by the success of the meningitis vaccine project, focused on developing and 
scaling up production of an affordable vaccine for use mainly in Africa.(56) The total 
costs were relatively small for this relatively low-risk product, though much greater 
than EUR38m. The outcome, however was highly successful and increases the 
credibility of PDPs as a tool for addressing the need for new drugs and vaccines in 
particular circumstances. 
5. Other issues 
5.1 Delinkage 
One of the problems that arises in pharmaceutical markets in the patent 
system is that high prices – which are used as a reward for innovation – reduce access 
to potentially life-saving drugs. This phenomenon is intrinsically linked to a free 
market combined with exclusivity rights granted to innovators. Innovators will 
maximize profits by raising price until the marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost, 
and this generally will require that some patients or groups of patients face a price 
above their willingness or ability to pay. We see this in high-income markets, in which 
many drugs are not covered by some insurers, as well as in low-income markets, in 
which prices may be too high for a large fraction of the population.(57) If a patient or 
insurer is willing to pay more than the marginal cost of production, but less than the 
price, then there are deadweight losses.  
One approach to avoiding the inefficiencies caused by monopoly pricing is to 
separate (or “delink”) the reward to the innovator from the price. One way of 
achieving this, as described above, is for society to fund R&D directly, and to allow 
competitive production of the resulting medicines. A second approach is to establish a 
reward or prize for developing a new medicine, which is then competitively produced. 
Delinkage has attracted considerable attention as a solution for antibiotics, which are 
challenged by the fact that commercial profits for these drugs do not appear to match 
the option value created by having antibiotics in reserve.(58) A key challenge for 
delinkage mechanisms is to determine how large this reward or prize should be. The 
obvious strategy is to make the reward dependent on the therapeutic value of the 
medicine.  
Senator Bernie Sanders introduced a bill into the US Congress to reform the 
entire pharmaceutical research system on the basis of delinkage.(59) A more modest 
effort along these lines is the Health Impact Fund proposal, under which the reward 
would be based on the health impact of the medicine in use.(60) The proposal is for a 
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large fund that would pay out a fixed amount annually, with the amount to be divided 
between all registered medicines annually. Registration would be optional, so that the 
reward rate would be self-regulating. Each registered product would have 10 years in 
the reward pool. A core part of the proposal is that it would allow products that are 
therapeutically important but not commercially valuable to be rewarded appropriately 
– for example, drugs for currently neglected diseases could generate substantial 
revenues.  
The approach faces two key challenges. First, measurement of the impact of a 
medicine is necessarily imperfect: how much imperfection can be tolerated in a system 
in which payments are based on assessed impact? This is, of course, a central question 
in many PBRSAs, as discussed above. Second, the fund would require collaboration 
between governments to financially support a substantial ongoing expense, estimated 
to be roughly $6bn per year, outside of their control.  
The Health Impact Fund would have the potential to increase the overall cost-
effectiveness of medicines, because it could allow for increased volumes without 
additional reimbursement. This property arises because the price of registered 
medicines is equal to their cost of production, thus allowing greater volume. Assuming 
that the total profit of the manufacturer is the same, by eliminating the deadweight 
loss attributable to high prices, total surplus increases. (Raising money to pay for 
rewards, of course, could create its own inefficiencies.) However, in countries with 
comprehensive, universal insurance for pharmaceuticals, its effects would be small. 
5.2 Exclusivity  
While patents have become increasingly standardized through World Trade 
Organization agreements, the duration of exclusivity enjoyed by an innovative drug 
varies substantially within and across countries.(61) Differences of interpretation in 
patent law, as well as other exclusivity measures, are very important, and this results in 
different effective exclusivity periods.(62) Tools include: patent term extensions in 
response to the regulatory delays; patent term extensions as a reward for pediatric 
trials; orphan drug market exclusivity; data exclusivity; and linkage. Some countries, 
led by India, have moved aggressively to restrict the set of inventions that are eligible 
for protection.(63) While driving down prices through, for example, compulsory 
licensing can enhance access and increase consumer surplus, there is some evidence 
that it is possible for countries to act too aggressively.(64)  
Within the context of a fixed total budget, one can see that various 
permutations of which drug gets what length of exclusivity mainly have the effect of 
rearranging how the money is distributed. That is, if the exclusivity period is 
lengthened for some drugs, it simply tightens budgetary constraints, leading either to 
lower prices or to fewer approved products. If the permutations do not result in more 
effective targeting of innovation expenditure, then they do not create any benefit, even 
for industry.   
The average length of exclusivity may however be a potent tool for increasing 
the value proposition of new therapies. The reason is that companies and investors 
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tend to have a higher discount rate than governments. The same is true for the cost of 
borrowing: corporate bond yields are higher than government bond yields for most 
high-income countries. Estimates of the cost of equity capital range between 9% and 
14% for pharmaceutical, biotech, and devices industries during the period 2001 – 
2008.(65) During the same period, US government 10-year bond rates averaged 
around 5%, indicating a substantial discrepancy between the private and public costs 
of capital.  
For the sake of simplicity, assume that governments have a discount rate of 
0%, and companies have an effective discount rate of 10%. If a company makes 
profits of $1m per year given a mark-up of $1 per pill, the net present value to the 
company is $6.2m over a ten-year exclusivity period. If the government grants a 5-year 
exclusivity period and allows a mark-up of $2 per pill, its cost is the same; but the net 
present value to the company is now $7.8m, about 25% higher. The key is that if there 
is a difference between the cost of capital to the pharmaceutical industry and the cost 
of capital to the government, front-loading the payment to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers substantially increases incentives to develop new drugs at little cost to 
the government.  
Ironically, pharmaceutical manufacturers have been pushing for longer 
exclusivity.(62,66) This strategy only makes sense in a ceteris paribus world in which 
budgets are not fixed and prices do not respond to exclusivity periods. Possibly 
industry is correct in assuming that prices are unresponsive to the average exclusivity 
period; however, even if prices are unresponsive, it seems likely that the set of covered 
drugs is responsive. As exclusivity periods increase, the insurer’s budget becomes 
more constrained, and fewer drugs are covered. If the budget is fixed, longer 
exclusivity periods caused by changes to patents cannot increase total spending: they 
only shift the revenues across products. Given this set of observations, and assuming 
a wedge between the public and private cost of capital, the effort to extend patent 
terms may undermine the financial sustainability of our systems of medical innovation 
without benefiting industry.  
6. Conclusions 
The complexity of medical innovation, with its range of different actors, 
presents a supremely challenging set of problems for sustainable financing. 
Fundamentally, we lack information on how much the world, or any country, should 
spend on supporting medical innovation; and we don’t know how to allocate a given 
budget across different potential or existing therapies. The result is a continuing 
competition between different ideas and institutional structures. As evidence mounts 
on the effectiveness of one or another, support shifts along with the shares of the 
total funding stream. In this context, it seems that the best hope for “sustainable” 
financing for innovative therapies is a continuing evolution of the structure of how we 
pay for new therapies.  
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